Rakuten just made a move that few saw coming. In early October， the company confirmed it would fold Rakuten Symphony—its cloud-native telecom arm—directly into the parent organization. The subsidiary， launched with much fanfare in 2021 to sell open RAN solutions globally， had been bleeding cash and losing key contracts. By absorbing Symphony， Rakuten eliminates a layer of management and， more importantly。signals that its grand ambition to become a telecom platform exporter is being scaled back. That's a sharp reversal from three years ago， when CEO Mickey Mikitani called Symphony the future of the company.The latest news from Rakuten isn't just about Symphony's retreat. It's also about money. Rakuten reported a consolidated operating loss of **¥37.5 billion** for the January–September period， narrower than the **¥102 billion** loss a year earlier。but still a loss. Mobile revenue grew **8.2%** year-on-year， yet the mobile unit remains unprofitable. CFO Kenji Hirose told analysts on the earnings call that the company expects mobile EBITDA to turn positive by mid-2025—a timeline repeated for the third consecutive quarter. I've tracked Rakuten's financials since 2019， and this pattern of “next year profitability” is starting to feel like a treadmill. The difference now is that Rakuten is cutting costs harder. Headcount in the mobile division dropped by roughly **12%** over the past six months.What strikes me is how quietly Rakuten has shifted its narrative. Two years ago， investor decks were full of global expansion maps and “Rakuten Mobile as a service” pitches. Today， the emphasis is on domestic cost discipline and cross-selling within the Rakuten ecosystem—points， banking， credit cards， and e-commerce. That's a more grounded story， but also a less exciting one. The latest news from Rakuten suggests a company that is retrenching， not conquering. The sale of Rakuten's stake in Seiyu， the supermarket chain it acquired with Walmart in 2020， fits that pattern. Rakuten confirmed in September it would sell its **20%** holding back to Walmart， raising about **¥60 billion** in cash. It's a pragmatic move。though it leaves Rakuten without a physical retail anchor in Japan.Not everything is grim. Rakuten's credit card business posted record transaction volume in Q3， up **15%** year-on-year。
and the Rakuten Bank IPO from earlier this year gave the group a valuable currency for future deals. The company also announced a partnership with OpenAI in August to integrate generative AI into its shopping and travel platforms. Details are thin—no specific products or launch dates—but Rakuten has a history of being an early adopter. If it can embed AI into its 100 million-plus user accounts， that could be a real differentiator. I'm skeptical of the hype， but the credit card and banking numbers show the ecosystem still works when Rakuten focuses on its core.So where does this leave Japan's would-be Amazon?The latest news from Rakuten paints a picture of a company that overextended and is now paying the price. Mikitani's genius was building a loyal user base through points and services. His mistake was assuming that same magic would work for building cell towers and selling software to foreign carriers. The coming year will test whether Rakuten can stabilize mobile without another cash injection and whether AI can actually move the needle. For now， the smart money is watching the mobile EBITDA line， not the press releases.
